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I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND TEXAS REGISTER ACT
As was noted in prior Survey Articles,' the enactment of article 6252-
13a, the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act,2 created uncer-
tainties relating to the litigation of state tax cases. Many of these uncer-
tainties remain unresolved.
In Contran Corp. v. Bullock3 the surviving corporation in a merger
transaction filed suit, contending that it was entitled to a refund for the
franchise taxes paid by the dissolved corporation prior to the merger. Al-
though the corporation alleged that the franchise taxes in question had
been "paid under protest, under implied duress, and through mistake of
law and/or [sic] fact,"' the record showed that the tax payment was made
without an accompanying written protest pursuant to article 1.05' or any
other indication that it was a payment under protest. The district court
ruled that the taxpayer corporation was not entitled to the relief sought.6
Affirming the district court, the court of civil appeals held that since the
taxpayer did not include the written protest required by article 1.05(1) with
its payment of the tax, the district court did not have jurisdiction and
therefore properly entered judgment that the corporation take nothing.
The court relied extensively on its previous decision in Robinson v. Bul-
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Attorney at Law, Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, Texas.
I. Rosenbaum, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 515, 516-17 (1978);
Burke, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 435, 437-38 (1977).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Register Act].
3. 567 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
4. Id. at 616. Contran argued that correspondence between Contran and the comp-
troller prior to payment notified the comptroller of the specific ground of the protest at the
time the tax was paid.
5. Section (i) of the protest statute, TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1969),
provides:
(1) Protest. Any person, firm, or corporation who may be required to pay
to the head of any department of the State Government any occupation, gross
receipts, franchise, license or other privilege tax or fee, and who believes or
contends that the same is unlawful and that such public official is not lawfully
entitled to demand or collect the same shall, nevertheless, be required to pay
such amount as such public official charged with the collection thereof may
deem to be due the State, and shall be entitled to accompany such payment
with a written protest, setting out fully and in detail each and every ground or
reason why it is contended that such demand is unlawful or unauthorized.
6. The district court decision was discussed at Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 516.
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lock,7 in which it held that since the protest statute created a right not
existing at common law and prescribed a specific remedy to enforce that
right, the courts could act only in the manner provided by the statute.
Robinson also held that there was no repugnancy between the protest stat-
ute and the Register Act; thus, the general repealer clause in the Register
Act8 did not impliedly repeal the protest statute. The Limited Sales, Ex-
cise and Use Tax Act 9 is the only state tax statute that expressly provides a
procedure whereby a taxpayer may initiate a refund suit to recover taxes
that were not paid under protest.'o As a result of the decisions in Robinson
and Contran, there is no procedure whereby a taxpayer may initiate a re-
fund suit to recover taxes, other than sales and use taxes, that were not
paid under protest.
As was discussed in last year's Survey Article," the uncertainties sur-
rounding the applicability of the Register Act to state taxes would best be
resolved by additional legislation. Such legislation should set forth specifi-
cally the jurisdictional basis for seeking review of a contested tax case as
well as the manner of review. Legislation is also needed to authorize re-
fund suits by taxpayers who remit taxes to the comptroller without protest.
Pending resolution of these issues, caution dictates that taxpayers involved
in state tax litigation comply with the requirements of both the protest
statute and the Register Act. Taxpayers filing suit for the recovery of sales
and use taxes should also comply with the requirements of article
20.1 0(G)-(I).' 2 Furthermore, proceedings at the administrative hearing
level should be conducted under the assumption that judicial review will
be on the basis of the substantial evidence rule.
A significant procedural development during the survey period was the
comptroller's decision to create an administrative law judge system to im-
prove that office's resolution of contested hearings. 3 Under the comptrol-
ler's newly adopted rules the administrative law judges will answer directly
to either the comptroller or his chief clerk and will be physically separated
from all other divisions of the comptroller's office." The hearings process
consists of a two-level system. After a contested case is commenced by the
7. 553 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
8. TEX. REV. CIw. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 22 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides
as follows:
Chapter 274, Acts of the 57th Legislature, Regular Session, 1961, as amended
(Article 6252-13, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), and all other laws and parts
of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed. This Act does not repeal any
existing statutory provisions conferring investigatory authority on any agency,
including any provision which grants an agency the power, in connection with
investigatory authority, to take depositions, administer oaths or affirmations,
examine witnesses, receive evidence, conduct hearings, or issue subpoenas or
summons.
9. TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.01-.20 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1978-79).
10. Id. art. 20.10.
11. Rosenbaum, supra note I, at 517.
12. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.10(G)-(I) (Vernon 1969).
13. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rules 026.01.03.001-.043, 4 Tex. Reg. 868-72 (1979).




filing of a petition for redetermination or for refund, the case proceeds to
the first level, which involves a prehearing procedure designed to dispose
of cases that do not present genuine disputes and generally can be resolved
through explanation of the auditor's work, correction of oversights and
mechanical errors, or acceptance of additional evidence. 5 During the pre-
hearing stage the comptroller will request the taxpayer to submit a state-
ment of grounds 6 that should: (1) list the items, individually or by
category, with which there is disagreement; (2) set forth the factual and
legal grounds why the tax should not be assessed or should be refunded
with respect to each disagreed item or category; and (3) submit evidence to
support each ground. 7 If the taxpayer does not know the factual or legal
basis of the comptroller's action that is the subject of the contested case, he
may request from the comptroller's hearings attorney a more definite and
detailed statement of the factual or legal basis of the action."8 A prelimi-
nary conference between the taxpayer and the hearings attorney may be
scheduled at a mutually agreeable time to try to resolve the controversy, or
to narrow disagreement as to the facts and define the legal issues in-
volved. 9 Following the submission of the taxpayer's statement of grounds
and the preliminary conference, if one is held, the hearings attorney will
send the taxpayer a position letter that will accept or reject, in whole or in
part, each of the taxpayer's contentions. 20 The taxpayer must accept or
reject the position letter within fifteen days after the date thereof on a form
that will be provided for this purpose.
If the taxpayer rejects the position letter by signing the form motion to
set for hearing, the proceedings move on to the second stage,2' which in-
volves a formal hearing. The taxpayer may submit a reply to the position
letter of the hearings attorney if he so indicates on his motion to set for
hearing.22 The hearings attorney must file a response within twenty days
after the taxpayer's reply is filed. Such response must state the comptrol-
ler's legal position and any factual disagreement with respect to each new
issue or argument raised by the taxpayer.2 3
When the hearing is convened by the administrative law judge, each
party will have an opportunity to present his case on an issue by issue basis
by calling and examining witnesses and introducing documentary evi-
dence. Each party also shall have the opportunity to cross-examine oppos-
ing witnesses on any matter relevant to the issue even though the matter
was not covered on direct examination.24
15. The prehearing procedures are set forth at Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rules
026.01.03.006-.012, 4 Tex. Reg. 868-69 (1979).
16. Id. Rule 026.01.03.007, 4 Tex. Reg. at 868.
17. Id. Rule 026.01.03.009, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
18. Id. Rule 026.01.03.008, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
19. Id. Rule 026.01.03.011, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
20. Id. Rule 026.01.03.012, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
21. Id. Rule 026.01.03.013, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
22. Id. Rule 026.01.03.017, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
23. Id. Rule 026.01.03.018, 4 Tex. Reg. at 869.
24. Id. Rule 026.01.03.021, 4 Tex. Reg. at 870.
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The rules of evidence set forth in the Register Act apply to all contested
cases.25 If the contested case involves the suspension or revocation of a
permit or the imposition of additional penalty for willful or fraudulent
failure to pay tax, the comptroller shall have the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that such action is warranted. In all other
cases, unless otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof shall be on
the taxpayer to show by a preponderance of the evidence in what respect
the action of the agency, as set out in the position letter, is incorrect.26
Within thirty days after the record is closed, the administrative law
judge will prepare a proposed decision setting out each finding of fact and
conclusion of law necessary to the decision. The proposed decision will be
served on the parties, and any party adversely affected may file exceptions
and briefs within ten days.27 Before the proposed decision of an adminis-
trative law judge is given any effect, it must be rendered by the comptrol-
ler.2" The comptroller's decision becomes final fifteen days from the date
of issuance, unless a motion for rehearing is filed on or before the fifteenth
day.29 To ensure access to the courts, any amounts found due in the comp-
troller's decision must be paid and suit for the recovery of such amounts
must be timely filed in a district court of Travis County, Texas, pursuant to
the provisions of the protest statute, article 1.05,30 or in the case of sales
and use taxes, pursuant to article 20.10.3 '
II. FRANCHISE TAXES
National Bancshares Corp. v. Bullock32 raised the question whether divi-
dends and interest received by bank holding companies from national
bank subsidiaries constitute gross receipts from business done in Texas
pursuant to article 12.02(l)(b). 3 Texas has adopted the "location of
25. Id. Rule 026.01.03.022. This rule specifically refers to section 14(a) of the Register
Act, which provides:
In contested cases, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall
be excluded. The rules of evidence as applied in nonjury civil cases in the
district courts of this state shall be followed. When necessary to ascertain facts
not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules, evidence not admissible
thereunder may be admitted, except where precluded by statute, if it is of a
type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. Agencies shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law.
Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted in the record.
Subject to these requirements, if a hearing will be expedited and the interests
of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially, any part of the evidence
may be received in written form.
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 14(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
26. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.01.03.041, 4 Tex. Reg. at 871.
27. Id. Rule 026.01.03.027, 4 Tex. Reg. at 870.
28. Id. Rule 026.0 1.03.028, 4 Tex. Reg. at 870.
29. Id.
30. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1969).
31. Id. art. 20.10.
32. 569 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ filed). The district court deci-
sion in National Bancshares was discussed in Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 518-19.
33. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(l)(b) (Vernon 1969) (article 12.02 sets forth the
allocation formula for determining the portion of a corporation's entire taxable capital that
[Vol. 33
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payor" rule for determining whether income from intangible assets such as
corporate stock or loans constitute gross receipts from business done in
Texas.34 Under the location of payor rule only dividends and interest re-
ceived from corporations incorporated in Texas constitute gross receipts
from business done in Texas. Dividends and interest received from corpo-
rations incorporated outside Texas are excluded, even though the corpora-
tion may be qualified to do business in Texas." At one time the
comptroller specifically applied the location of payor rule to bank holding
companies and excluded dividends and interest paid to them by their na-
tional bank subsidiaries within the state.36
In 1969 the federal statute governing state taxation of national banks17
was amended by Public Law 91-15638 to provide that, for the purpose of
any tax law enacted under the authority of any state, a national bank shall
be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the state or
other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located. The provi-
sions of Public Law 91-156 took effect on January 1, 1973. In 1971 the
Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 730,"9 which provides that the pas-
sage of Public Law 91-156 shall not operate to impose or permit the impo-
sition of any additional tax or taxes upon the "institutions affected
thereby" unless (1) the tax or taxes were being imposed prior to January 1,
1971, or (2) such institutions are specifically designated as being subject to
such additional tax or taxes, other than the limited sales and use tax, by an
act of the legislature passed subsequent to the effective date of Public Law
91-156.
On April 18, 1974, the comptroller published Ruling 80-0.18,4o which
recognizes that dividends and interest paid by national bank subsidiaries
to bank holding companies prior to January 1, 1973, are not gross receipts
from business done in Texas. The ruling provides, however, that by virtue
of Public Law 91-156, dividends and interest paid on or after January 1,
1973, by a national bank whose principal office is located within Texas are
includable in a corporation's gross receipts from business done in Texas
within the meaning of article 12.02(l)(b). 4'
In National Bancshares the district court entered a judgment against the
taxpayers that would have required the bank holding companies to include
is subject to the State of Texas's franchise tax, and the gross receipts from the corporation's
business done in Texas is one of the variables required by the formula).
34. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. 1967).
35. Id.
36. Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013(2)(t). The comptroller's rulings may be
found in the following looseleaf services: TEX. STATE TAX REP. (CCH); STATE & Loc.
TAXES (P-H); [TEXAS] INH. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976).
38. Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-156, §§ l(a), 2(a), 83 Stat. 434 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 548 (1976)).
39. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 292, art. 7, § 1, at 1206 (codified as a footnote in TEx.
TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79)).
40. On Dec. 31, 1975, ruling 80-0.18 was reissued as Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Rule 026.02.12.013(2)(t)(1976).
41. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(l)(b)(iv) (Vernon 1969).
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dividends and interest from national bank subsidiaries in their post-Janu-
ary 1, 1973, gross receipts from business done in Texas. The court of civil
appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the provisions of
Public Law 91-156 did not mandate a change in the state taxation of cor-
porations owning national bank stock. Instead, the court viewed the fed-
eral legislation as simply allowing the states to treat national banks like
state banks for purposes of equal taxation. The court reasoned that the
concept of equal taxation of banks was unrelated to the taxation of divi-
dends and interest from national bank stock held by corporate sharehold-
ers. Further, the court held that even if Public Law 91-156 was intended to
cure unequal franchise tax treatment of corporations owning stock in na-
tional banks, House Bill 730 prohibited the change in the tax structure
attempted by the comptroller. The court reasoned that corporations own-
ing stock in national banks were "institutions affected" by Public Law 91-
156 and that the required inclusion of dividends and interest from those
banks in the stockholders' gross receipts from business done in Texas, re-
sulting in substantially increased taxes, constituted the imposition of an
additional tax within the meaning of House Bill 730.
The comptroller contended that the construction of House Bill 730
urged by the taxpayers would lead to an unjust result in that it would cause
inequality of taxation among bank holding companies and corporations
generally. Rejecting this contention, the court reasoned that the comptrol-
ler's challenge went to the inherent inequality of the location of payor test
and that such a challenge was beyond the comptroller's authority by virtue
of a prior supreme court holding" that the location of payor test could be
changed only by legislative action.
As was noted in last year's Survey Article,43 an amendment to Comp-
troller's Business Tax Ruling .015(3)(d) affected the method of accounting
for a corporation's investment in its subsidiaries." The ruling presently
requires all parent or investor corporations to use the cost method of ac-
counting in calculating and reporting the franchise tax on its investment in
subsidiaries or investees, regardless of the accounting method otherwise
used by the corporation. Prior to the amendment the ruling provided that
whatever method, cost or equity, a parent or investor corporation used to
record its investments on its books and records of account had to be fol-
lowed for franchise tax purposes. The amendment is applicable to any
franchise tax report required to be filed after December 13, 1977. Several
suits have been filed testing the validity of the ruling as it existed prior to
its amendment in 1977 .4' The suits allege that a corporation should not be
required to use the equity method for franchise tax purposes even though
that method was used by the corporation for financial accounting pur-
42. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 180 (Tex. 1967).
43. Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 521-22.
44. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.12.015(3)(d), 2 Tex. Reg. 4625 (1977).
45. See Burke, supra note 1, at 441 n.45, and cases cited therein.
[Vol. 33
TAXATION
poses. In one of those cases, Ensearch Corp. v. Bullock,46 the district court
of Travis County entered judgment for the taxpayer. Accordingly, the cor-
poration's use of the cost method for franchise tax reporting purposes was
approved even though the corporation had used the equity method to re-
cord its investment in its subsidiaries on its books and records.
The comptroller issued several administrative decisions pertaining to
franchise tax treatment during the survey period. These decisions involved
the includability of items in taxable capital, 7 the definition of taxable
debt,48 the allocation of taxable capital to Texas,49 and the requirement
that a corporation's franchise tax report must be based on its books and
records.5"
III. SALES AND USE TAXES
In Lorenzo Textile Mills, Inc. v. Bullock5' the court held that article
20.06(D)(1)52 is the appropriate statute of limitations when the comptroller
issues a notice of deficiency determination in a sales and use tax case. The
46. No. 247,819 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 200th Judicial Dist. of Texas, July 26,
1978). This case is being appealed to the Austin court of civil appeals.
47. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7475 (1977) (investment in a "foreign
shipping companies" account, which represented the taxpayer's investment in ships sailing
under foreign flags, was includable in the taxpayer's surplus for franchise tax purposes; a
revaluation account representing an estimate of the excess value of goodwill arising from the
value of the taxpayer's patents as well as the overall value of its business was includable in
the taxpayer's taxable capital on the ground that it reflected the taxpayer's fiscal condition);
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8253 (1977) (a reserve account consisting of the
taxpayer's estimated cost of its Christmas gifts to employees was a proper deduction from
taxable capital to the extent of the actual expenses charged off on the taxpayer's year-end
statement); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9867 (1978) (a reserve account which
represented an estimate of the corporation's possible future federal income tax liability rep-
resented a contingent liability not yet due and was therefore properly includable as part of
the corporation's taxable capital).
48. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9070 (1978) (a convertible debenture
having a due date of more than one year from the date of issuance was includable as taxable
debt for periods prior to May 1, 1973, pursuant to 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 1, at 187).
49. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8999 (1977) (where the taxpayer's por-
tion of an interstate shipment was wholly within Texas, the freight revenues earned thereon
were properly considered as receipts from services performed within Texas pursuant to TEX.
TAx.-GEN ANN. art. 12.02(l)(b)(ii) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision
No. 7606 (1978) (insurance proceeds received on fire and casualty policies for the repair or
replacement of damaged or destroyed property are not receipts from business done in Texas
because the proceeds do not represent sales or other business receipts); Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 8732 (1978) (although a parent corporation accounts for its invest-
ments in its subsidiary on the equity basis on its books and records, the dividend from the
subsidiary cannot be considered as a Texas receipt until the dividend is lawfully declared by
the subsidiary); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9197 (1978) (a corporation must
follow the procedures set forth in Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Franchise Tax Rule
026.02.12.003 before its petition for an alternate allocation formula will be considered).
50. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10085 (1978) (pursuant to Comptroller
of Pub. Accounts, Franchise Tax Rule 026.02.12.001 & .015, the books and records that a
corporation must use in filing its franchise tax report are its general and special journals and
ledgers and not its working papers and financial statements); accord, Comptroller's Admin-
istrative Decision No. 9830 (1978).
51. 566 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ). The district court decision
was discussed in Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 527-28.
52. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.06(D)(1) (Vernon 1969).
1979]
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statute provides that "[elvery notice of a deficiency determination shall be
personally served or mailed within four years after the last day of the cal-
endar month following the quarterly period for which the amount is pro-
posed to be determined or within four years after the return is filed,
whichever period expires the later."53 The periods for which deficiencies
were assessed by the comptroller extended from April 1, 1966, through
December 31, 1973. The comptroller gave the taxpayer notice of the al-
leged deficiencies on April 29, 1974. The taxpayer paid all taxes, penalty,
and interest due for the periods after 1970, but paid the amounts due for
the periods prior to that time under protest.
The issue presented to the court of civil appeals was whether the taxes
were barred after four years under article 20.06(D)(1) or were not barred
due to the subsequent enactment of article 1.045(A). 4 The latter article
sets forth a general statute of limitations of seven years in tax assessment
cases and provides that "[i]n the case of gross error in information reported
in a return that would increase the amount of tax payable by twenty-five
percent (25%) or more . . . the tax may be assessed and collected . . . at
any time."55 The taxpayer countered that the provisions of article
1.045(A) did not affect the four-year limitations period imposed by article
20.06(D)(1), asserting that the unextended four-year limitations period was
confirmed by article 1.045(B),56 which specifically provides a four-year
statute of limitations for sales and use taxes.
Sustaining the taxpayer's position, the court held that article 1.045(A)
and article 1.045(B) stood in harmony with article 20.06(D)(1) and that it
was the legislative intent to achieve such harmony and not to repeal or
destroy article 20.06(D)(1) by implication. The decision also noted that by
including the introductory clause of article 1.045(A), "[elxcept where a
shorter period of time is provided in this Title,"57 the legislature recog-
nized the continued validity of article 20.06(D)(1). Further, the court rea-
soned that article 1.045(B), which reiterates the four-year period as to sales
and use taxes, preserved the limitations period established by article
20.06(DX 1).
The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Bullock v. Lone Star Gas
Co.58 considered whether the use tax exemption of article 20.04(G)(3)(a)59
applied to the use and storage of pipeline materials. Article 20.04(G)(3)(a)
exempts from the use tax the use in Texas of tangible personal property
acquired outside the state and moved into the state for use as a licensed
and certificated carrier of persons or property. In 1972 the Travis County
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 1.045.
55. The taxpayer in Lorenzo admitted that the error in the reported tax would amount
to an increase in the tax of 25% or more. 566 S.W.2d at 110.
56. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.045(B) (Vernon 1969).
57. Id. art. 1.045(A).
58. 567 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1978).
59. TEX. TOx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(G)(3)(a) (Vernon 1969).
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district court held in Explorer Pipeline Co. v. Calvert6 that article
20.04(G)(3)(a) exempted pipe and other component parts purchased
outside the state and brought into the state for incorporation into a pipe-
line. The comptroller did not appeal the decision and granted use tax re-
funds to other pipeline carriers that had made similar purchases of
pipeline materials.6 ' The comptroller subsequently changed his policy and
issued a sales tax ruling providing that items of tangible personal property
that are to be assembled into carriers are not exempted by article
20.04(G)(3)(a) because such items are not licensed and certificated carriers
when they enter the state.62
In Lone Star Gas the taxpayer, which held a permit from the Texas
Railroad Commission, was engaged in the business of gathering, transport-
ing, and selling natural gas. During 1972 the taxpayer decided to construct
an intrastate pipeline in Texas. Portions of the pipe incorporated into the
pipeline were purchased from the Crispin Corporation of Houston, Texas,
whose major business activity was brokering foreign steel products. Pursu-
ant to its contract with the taxpayer, Crispin arranged for the pipe to be
manufactured according to the taxpayer's specifications by mills in France
and Italty. Crispin purchased the pipe from these foreign mills and sold it
to the taxpayer. The taxpayer employed an independent firm to inspect
the pipe during its production, manufacture, and shipment to Texas. Title
passed to the taxpayer when the pipe was loaded for shipment in Europe,
but Crispin was responsible for transportation of the pipe from Europe to
a commercial pipe treatment facility near Houston, Texas. After the pipe
arrived in Houston, it was taken to a storage yard, where it remained for
periods as long as sixty days. The pipe then was moved to the yard of the
firm that coated the pipe for corrosion protection. Thereafter, the pipe was
loaded on the taxpayer's trucks and shipped to West Texas.
The court of civil appeals held that the pipe was exempt from the use tax
pursuant to article 20.04(G)(3)(a). On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court
the comptroller contended that the transaction was subject to state and
local sales and use taxes upon each of three statutory bases: (1) as a sale
60. No. 193,423 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Nov. 16,
1972).
61. Defendant's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions and
Written Interrogatories, Admission No. 19, Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co., 567 S.W.2d 493
(Tex. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1978).
62. See Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.17 (1975), which provides:
Carrier devices such as ships and aircraft, which are acquired outside this
state and are moved into this state for use as a licensed and certificated carrier
of persons or property, are exempt from the Use Tax. Such carriers are enti-
tled to this exemption only if acquired outside Texas. Repair or replacement
parts which are acquired outside this state and actually affixed in this state to a
self-propelled vehicle which is a licensed and certificated carrier of persons or
property are exempt from the Use Tax. Trailers, barges and semitrailers are
not considered to be self-propelled vehicles. Taxable items which are to be
assembled into carriers are not exempt under the provisions of Article
20.04(G)(3)(a) as such items are not licensed and certificated carriers when
they enter the state.
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under articles 20.0263 and 20.01(K);64 (2) as a use under articles 20.0365
and 20.01(R);66 and (3) as a storage under articles 20.0367 and 20.01(N).68
The taxpayer argued that neither the sale nor the storage was a taxable
event and that any use of the pipe in Texas was exempt pursuant to article
20.04(G)(3)(a). The supreme court rejected Lone Star's contentions and
held that article 20.03 imposes a separate tax on the use of property, the
storage of property, and any other consumption of property. The court
reasoned that article 20.04(G)(3)(a) exempts solely the use of certain prop-
erty from tax and does not apply to the separate tax on the storage of such
property.69 Accordingly, the court determined that the pipe was subject to
state and local use taxes.
There are several questionable aspects of the Lone Star Gas decision.
First, the court's reasoning that article 20.03 imposes separate taxes on the
use, storage, and other consumption of property and that article
20.04(G)(3)(a) does not exempt the latter two events from taxation is sub-
ject to criticism. Article 20.01(R)7" defines the word "use" to include "the
exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to
the ownership of that tangible personal property." Since the keeping or
storage of property constitutes the exercise of a right or power over such
property, such activity would constitute a use pursuant to the broad defini-
tion contained in article 20.01(R). Accordingly, any storage of the pipe
within the meaning of article 20.01(N) arguably constitutes a use of the
pipe as defined in article 20.01(R), which would be exempted from the use
tax by article 20.04(G)(3)(a).
Another questionable aspect of the Lone Star Gas decision is the court's
effort to buttress its reasoning by relying on United States Supreme Court
and state court decisions that have determined whether state sales and use
taxes imposed on tangible personal property constitute an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce. 7' The court's reasoning indicates that the
court believes that article 20.04(G)(3)(a) is intended to exempt only items
of tangible personal property that are immune from state taxation due to
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.72 Such conclusion,
if intended by the court, would make article 20.04(G)(3)(a) totally super-
63. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
64. Id. art. 20.01(K) (Vernon 1969).
65. Id. art. 20.03.
66. Id. art. 20.01(R).
67. Id. art. 20.03.
68. Id. art. 20.01(N).
69. In its motion for rehearing Lone Star vigorously objected to the court's holding that
there was a storage of the pipe. Lone Star asserted that it was using the pipe from the time it
took title in Europe and that such use was exempt pursuant to art. 20.04(G)(3)(a). Respon-
dent's Motion for Rehearing at 1-5, Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co., 567 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1978).
70. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(R) (Vernon 1969).
71. The cases relied upon were Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); American Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 216 Cal. App. 2d 180, 30 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Northern Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Lauterbach, 251 Iowa 885, 100 N.W.2d 908 (1960).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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fluous because article 20.04(C)7 3 already exempts from Texas sales and use
taxes items of tangible personal property that the state is prohibited from
taxing under the United States Constitution.
Two decisions during the survey period interpreted article 20.01(T),74
which governs the sales and use tax treatment of repairmen and contrac-
tors. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bullock75 the Texas Supreme Court
examined the issue of whether a taxpayer who installs shock absorbers in
customers' automobiles and charges a lump-sum price that includes both
parts and labor is a "repairman" for sales tax purposes. Article 20.01(T)
defines a contractor or repairman as any person who performs any repair
services upon tangible personal property or who performs any improve-
ment upon real estate, and who, as a necessary and incidental part of per-
forming such services, incorporates tangible personal property belonging
to him into the property being so repaired or improved.76 Under repair
contracts that specify a lump-sum price covering both the services and the
necessary incidental material, the repairman is considered to be the ulti-
mate consumer of the tangible personal property furnished by him if he
incorporates it into the customer's property as a necessary and incidental
part of performing the repair services. Since the repairman is considered
the ultimate consumer of this property, the repairman is not required to
collect any tax from the customer on the lump-sum charge or any portion
thereof.77
In the Firestone case Firestone paid a retail sales tax on approximately
one-half of the shock absorbers in question at the time it purchased them
at retail from local suppliers. Firestone bought the remainder in its capac-
ity as a wholesaler, and taxes were paid to the comptroller on these shock
absorbers as they were sold through Firestone's repair shops. Firestone
did not sell shock absorbers over the counter at retail; instead, it made
installations in customers' vehicles for a lump-sum price that included all
the costs of materials and labor. At stake in this case was the difference
between the amount of taxes Firestone had already paid to retailers and
directly to the comptroller and the amount the comptroller found to be due
by treating Firestone's lump-sum installations as retail sales of shock ab-
sorbers.
Firestone contended that the installation of shock absorbers was neces-
sary and incidental to the repair of automobiles and that it was not re-
quired to charge and collect sales taxes on the lump-sum price. The
comptroller argued that Firestone's installation was merely incidental to
the sale of shock absorbers and that Firestone was responsible for charging
and collecting sales taxes from its customers based on the total price of the
installation.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the comptroller's contention that
73. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(C) (Vernon 1969).
74. Id. art. 20.01(T).
75. 573 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1978).
76. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(T) (Vernon 1969).
77. Id. See also Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.011 (1969).
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experience, special skill, and knowledge are negligible factors in the instal-
lation of shock absorbers and that Firestone did not come within the statu-
tory definition of a repairman when performing a simple shock absorber
installation. The stipulated findings indicated, however, that on some oc-
casions customers brought automobiles to Firestone's shops, described
general problems with respect to the automobile, and asked Firestone to
make repairs. New shock absorbers sometimes were installed during the
course of such repair work. The court inferred from the stipulations that
in certain instances Firestone was expected to rely upon its experience and
to exercise skill and judgment in analyzing the problem and in furnishing
necessary repair service. The court also inferred that replacement of shock
absorbers would not be the full extent of repair in many of these transac-
tions. Thus, in instances where work other than replacement of shock ab-
sorbers was performed, the replacement of shock absorbers could well be
necessary and incidental to the repair service rendered. From this factual
record the court determined that Firestone replaced shock absorbers on
customers' cars in the performance of lump-sum general repair services
and that Firestone incorporated its own shock absorbers into the vehicles
being repaired as a necessary and incidental part of performing the repair
service. Thus, Firestone was placed within the statutory definition of re-
p airman and was relieved from charging and collecting sales taxes on the
ump-sum repair price.
The definition of contractor as set forth in article 20.01(T) was consid-
ered in Brazos Concrete Products, Inc. v. Bullock.7" Brazos manufactured
prestressed and precast concrete items used in the construction of highway
bridges and buildings. At issue was the applicability of sales and use taxes
to equipment used by Brazos in manufacturing concrete products for sale
to general contractors who incorporated the concrete products into high-
ways pursuant to contracts with the Texas Department of Highways and
Public Transportation. Article 20.04(Y)7 9 exempts from tax items of tangi-
ble personal property used by a contractor in the performance of a contract
for the improvement of realty if the contract is with certain entities that are
exempt from sales and use taxes, including the Department of Highways
and Public Transportation.80 Brazos contended that its equipment was ex-
empt from tax under this statute. The court found that Brazos neither in-
78. 567 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
79. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(Y) (Vernon 1969) provides:
(Y) Contracts with Exempt Organizations. There are exempted from the
computation of the amount of taxes imposed by this Chapter, the receipts
from the sale, lease or rental of any tangible personal property to, or the stor-
age, use or other consumption of tangible personal property by, any contractor
for the performance of a contract for the improvement of realty for an exempt
organization as defined in Section 20.04(H) of this Chapter or otherwise ex-
empt from the taxes imposed by this Chapter to the extent of the value of the
tangible personal property so used or consumed or both in the performance of
such contract.
80. The Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation is exempt from
sales tax pursuant to TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(H)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79), which
exempts the State of Texas and its unincorporated agencies and instrumentalities.
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corporated the concrete products into the realty nor contracted with a tax
exempt organization to incorporate such products into the realty. Instead,
Brazos contracted with a private, taxpaying corporation to deliver the
products to the job site, and therefore, was a supplier rather than a con-
tractor or subcontractor.
In Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Southwestern Apparel, Inc. 81 eleven
plaintiff corporations sought, individually and as representatives of a class
of those similarly situated, to recover state sales taxes allegedly collected
from them upon their purchases of natural gas and electricity. The plain-
tiffs maintained that portions of their gas and electricity purchases were
exempt from taxation under article 20.04(R) 82 because such portions were
used in connection with manufacturing as opposed to commercial or resi-
dential use. The plaintiffs contended that Comptroller's Ruling 95-0.07,11
which governs exemption certificates, and Comptroller's Ruling 95-0.12,
which governs natural gas and electricity,84 were ultra vires or otherwise
illegal.
Comptroller's Ruling 95-0.12 sets forth the predominant use rule, which
states that natural gas or electricity measured by a single meter and used
for both exempt and nonexempt purposes during a regular monthly billing
period shall be either totally exempt or nonexempt for the billing period,
depending on the predominant use of such natural gas or electricity. The
court upheld the validity of the predominant use rule after finding that the
rule was in harmony with the general objectives of the sales and use tax
statutes, had been found to be workable through many years of applica-
tion, and was used only when there was no practical way to determine
what part of the gas or electricity was used in a taxable manner.
Comptroller's Ruling 95-0.07, which also was challenged by the plain-
tiffs, places an affirmative duty on any party claiming an exemption from
sales and use taxes to furnish an exemption certificate to the seller. The
plaintiffs argued that there is nothing in article 20.04(R) that expressly or
impliedly gives the comptroller authority to impose burdens, conditions,
and restrictions that are in excess of or inconsistent with the statutory pro-
visions. Rejecting this contention, the court relied on article 20.11,8" which
authorizes the comptroller to promulgate rules and regulations relating to
the administration and enforcement of the Limited Sales, Excise and Use
Tax Act. The court reasoned that administration and enforcement of the
sales and use tax statutes would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
without the use of exemption certificates. Since the ruling's provisions
were found to be in harmony with the general objectives of the statute, the
81. 558 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. A .- Austin 1977, writ dism'd).
82. TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 2 ' R) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
83. On Dec. 31, 1975, Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling 95-0.07 was recodified as Comp-
troller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.007 (1975).
84. On Dec. 31, 1975, Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling 95-0.12 was recodified as Comp-
troller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.015. (1975).
85. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.11 (Vernon 1969).
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court concluded that the comptroller had not exceeded his rule-making
powers.
Transactions that are subject to the state sales tax also give rise to local
tax liability if they are consummated in a city that has adopted a local sales
and use tax pursuant to the Local Sales and Use Tax Act.86 Under that
Act all intrastate retail sales are consummated at the place of business of
the retailer. If the retailer has more than one place of business in the state,
the place at which its sales are consummated is the place where the pur-
chaser takes possession of the property. If the retailer delivers the prop-
erty, however, the sale is consummated at the place of business from which
it was delivered.87 In Dunigan Tool & Supply Co. v. Bullock88 the district
court of Travis County considered the application of the Local Sales and
Use Tax Act to a retailer who had more than one place of business within
the state. The first issue that the court addressed involved certain sales of
oil field pipe, casing, rods, and other tubular goods from Dunigan's inven-
tory located within bonded, unrelated trucking yard facilities where Duni-
gan leased storage space on a month-to-month basis.89 The tubular goods
at the storage facilities were segregated and identifiable as Dunigan's in-
ventory.9° Although Dunigan did not keep full-time personnel at the stor-
age facilities, the facilities were open twenty-four hours a day, and
Dunigan's employees or representatives periodically entered the premises
to conduct inspections and inventories. In addition, Dunigan sometimes
brought customers to these storage facilities to let them examine the goods.
On the basis of his own administrative ruling,9 the comptroller asserted
that trucking yard facilities in which Dunigan leased storage space did not
constitute "places of business." Since neither delivery nor transfer of pos-
session was made from any of Dunigan's places of business, the comptrol-
ler asserted that, for local tax purposes, the sales of pipe were deemed to be
consummated at Dunigan's place of business in Texas to which the person
86. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
87. Id. § 6(B).
88. No. 265,198 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 31, 1978).
The case is being appealed to the Austin court of civil appeals.
89. In addition to its leased facilities, Dunigan also maintained a number of retail stores
within the state. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Dunigan Tool & Supply Co.
v. Bullock, No. 265,198 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 31,
1978).
90. Id. at 3.
91. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.22.004(2)(a) (1975) provides:
For the purpose of the local sales tax, it is immaterial that title or possession of
the taxable items sold, leased or rented passes to the purchaser at a place
outside of the local taxing jurisdiction in which the retailer's place of business
is located. The term "place of business" means any regularly established of-
fice or location within the State of Texas operated by the vendor for the pur-
pose of selling or taking orders for taxable items. The term "place of
business" does not include a warehouse or storage location from which sales
are not regularly made. Under the local sales tax, where the retailer has only
one place of business, all retail sales, leases or rentals, except sales of natural
gas or electricity, are consummated at that place of business unless the taxable
item is delivered by the retailer or his agent to an out-of-state destination or to
a carrier for delivery to an out-of-state destination.
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making the sale or taking the sales order was assigned.92 The district court
rejected the comptroller's contention on two grounds. First, the district
court made a fact finding that the pipe facilities were Dunigan's "places of
business." 93 Pursuant to that finding, sales of tubular goods were deemed
to be consummated for local tax purposes at the yard where the purchaser
took possession or the yard from which the goods were delivered by Duni-
gan to the purchaser.94 Second, the court stated that since the purchaser
took possession of the goods at the leased facilities, the sales were consum-
mated at such facilities for local tax purposes regardless of whether they
constituted "places of business." To the extent that the facilities were lo-
cated outside of local taxing jurisdictions, Dunigan owed no local sales tax.
To the extent that sales were made from Dunigan's inventory in leased
storage facilities that were located within the limits of a city that had
adopted the Local Sales and Use Tax Act, Dunigan owed local sales
taxes.95
The second issue in Dunigan involved sales from a manufacturer or mill
located within Texas. Dunigan had arranged for goods to be shipped di-
rectly to the customer from the in-state facility of the original manufac-
turer. The court found that section 6(B)(1) of the Local Sales and Use Tax
92. Id. Rule 026.02.22.004(2)(d) provides:
In the event the retailer has more than one place of business in the State but
neither delivery nor transfer of possession of the taxable item is made from or
at any of the retailer's places of business, the sale is consummated at the re-
tailer's place of business in Texas to which the person making the sale or tak-
ing the order for the taxable items is assigned. Sales made or orders taken by
a salesperson not assigned to any of the retailer's places of business in Texas
will be treated as sales by itinerant vendors which sales are consummated
within the city where the order is taken.
93. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3. This point was elaborated on by the
district court in conclusion of law number 5, which provided:
A "place of business" is not defined by either the State Act or the Local Act.
The Comptroller's determination of a place of business (whatever may be the
applicability in a different context) is not controlling here where a plain read-
ing of the statute clearly sets forth the place where a sale is consummated with
respect to Plaintiff's inventory sales. The fact that Plaintiff did not obtain a
Sales Tax Permit for these pipe facilities has no bearing on the imposition of
the place where a sale is consummated for purposes of the Local Act since the
purpose for requiring a Sales Tax Permit is merely administrative.
Id. at 6.
94. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.22.004(2)(c) (1975).
95. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6-7. The district court's conclusion was
based on TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c, § 6(B)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (empha-
sis added), which provides in part:
If the retailer has more than one place of business in the State, the place or
places at which retail sales, leases, and rentals are consummated shall be the
retailer's place or places where the purchaser or lessee takes possession and
removes from the retailer's premises the articles of tangible personal property,
or if the retailer delivers the tangible personal property to a point designated
by the purchaser or lessee, then the sales, leases, or rentals are consummated
at the retailer's place or places of business from which tangible personal prop-
erty is delivered to the purchaser or lessee.
The district court concluded that the pipe facilities were Dunigan's "place or places" where
the sales were consummated. In so holding, the court rejected the comptroller's assertion
that the phrase "retailer's place or places" contained in art. 1066c, § 6(B)(1) should be read
"place or places of business."
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Act96 was silent with respect to where the sale was consummated since the
manufacturer's mill or mill inventory was not Dunigan's "place." There-
fore, pursuant to section 6(A) of the Local Sales and Use Tax Act,9 7 the
court was required to look to the state sales and use tax statutes. Relying
on judicial precedents,98 the district court held that under the state sales
and use tax statutes a sale takes place when the goods are segregated in
contemplation of a transfer of either title or possession of the goods to a
purchaser.99 Since segregation of the tubular goods occurred at the manu-
facturer's mill or at the location of the manufacturer's mill inventory
within Texas, Dunigan owed local sales tax only to the extent that the mill
or mill inventory was located within a city that had adopted the Local
Sales and Use Tax Act. I°° In so holding, the district court rejected the
comptroller's contention that the sales were consummated for local tax
purposes at Dunigan's place of business to which the employee who made
the sale or took the order was assigned.'
The third issue in the Dunigan case involved sales to customers who
placed orders at one of Dunigan's offices in a city that had adopted the
Local Sales and Use Tax Act where the ordered goods were shipped di-
rectly to the customer from an out-of-state facility of an independent man-
ufacturer. The comptroller contended that this type of transaction gave
rise to a sale for local sales and use tax purposes, which was deemed to be
consummated where the order was placed."2 Rejecting the comptroller's
position, the court concluded that the sale occurred outside of Texas.
When a customer orders goods through a Texas vendor that are shipped
directly to the customer by an out-of-state manufacturer, the goods are
segregated in contemplation of transfer of possession at the out-of-state
manufacturer's mill or mill stock inventory site. As a result, the sales are
consummated at the out-of-state mills and are not subject to state and local
sales taxes. Consequently, the court concluded that the only tax that could
be imposed in connection with the transaction was a use tax.' 3 The appli-
cability of the local use tax depends upon the point at which the purchaser
stores, uses, or consumes the goods."° The point at which the order is
taken therefore has no bearing on the determination of whether the local
tax is owing. Accordingly, the court concluded that a local use tax would
be due on transactions in this category only to the extent that the destina-
tion or delivery points were within a city that had adopted the Local Sales
and Use Tax Act. In all other instances the local use tax would not apply
96. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c, § 6(B)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
97. Id. § 6(A) (applicable provisions of state tax statutes apply to collection of local tax,
except as modified by the Local Sales and Use Tax Act).
98. Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co., 567 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1978); Gifford-Hill & Co. v.
State, 442 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969).
99. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7.
100. Id. at 7-8.
101. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.22.004(2)(d) (1975).
102. Id.
103. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7.
104. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.02.22.005(1) (1975).
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since the delivery point was outside a local taxing jurisdiction.105
The final issue in Dunigan involved sales of supplies that were not segre-
gated until they were used at a delivery site located outside of a local tax-
ing jurisdiction.' 6 Generally Dunigan's customers would order drilling
mud and drilling bits based upon a predetermined estimate. The custom-
ers contacted mud and bit companies directly for delivery of various
grades of mud and bits to the well sites. The companies would normally
deliver a greater quantity than was necessary, and any unused supplies at
the time of the completion of the well would be returned at no charge. The
companies would then bill Dunigan for the supplies that were actually
used, and Dunigan in turn would bill its customers. Dunigan generally
had no knowledge of these sales until after the materials were used. The
court concluded that the Local Sales and Use Tax Act was silent with re-
spect to the place at which the sales were consummated since the delivery
points and the use of the materials were at well sites outside of city limits,
and the goods were delivered directly to Dunigan's customers by the man-
ufacturer or processor of the items. Based on the state sales and use tax
statutes, the court ruled that a segregation in contemplation of transfer of
title to or possession of the mud and bits occurred at the drill site. Since
the sales were consummated for local tax purposes at well sites situated
outside of local taxing jurisdictions, no local sales or use taxes were due.'o7
If Dunigan is upheld on appeal, it will result in the reversal of several of
the comptroller's administrative rulings relating to the administration of
the Local Sales and Use Tax Act.' Consequently, the appellate decisions
in the Dunigan case will be of great significance.
The legislature amended article 20.04(R)' °9 of the Limited Sales, Excise
and Use Tax Act to provide that gas and electricity used for residential
purposes are exempt from state sales and use taxes. The amendment ex-
panded the definition of "residential use" to include a multi-family apart-
ment or housing complex or building or portion thereof occupied as a
home or residence. 0 The Local Sales and Use Tax Act was amended to
provide that until October 1, 1979, gas and electricity used for residential
purposes are subject to local tax in cities imposing a local sales and use tax
unless such sales are exempted by the city. Effective October 1, 1979, sales
of gas and electricity for residential use are exempt from the one percent
local tax unless prior to May 1, 1979, the governing body of the city votes
to continue the tax."' An opinion of the attorney general"2 concluded
105. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7-8.
106. Id. at 4.
107. Id. at 7-8.
108. See notes 91, 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
109. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(R) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
110. Id.
111. The local sales and use tax changes were accomplished through the addition or
amendment of the following statutory provisions: TEX. REV.'CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c,
§ 2(B) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (the sales tax portion of any local sales and use tax is im-
posed at the rate of one percent on the receipts from sales at retail of gas and electricity for
residential purposes within a city imposing a local tax); id. § 2(L) (providing a procedure for
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that, pursuant to these amendments to the Local Sales and Use Tax Act,
cities that first adopt the Local Sales and Use Tax Act after October 1,
1979, may not impose the local tax on the residential use of gas and elec-
tricity.
The comptroller issued numerous administrative decisions regarding
sales and use taxes during the survey period, most of which are of only
minor significance.' 13  These decisions involved local sales and use
taxes, 114 classification of items as tangible personal property or improve-
ments to realty, "15 the occasional sale exemption, "16 miscellaneous exemp-
adding the tax on gas and electricity for residential use to the sales price); id. § 4(A) (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1979, sales of gas and electricity for residential use are exempt from the one
percent local tax unless prior to May 1, 1979, the governing body of the city, by majority
vote of the membership of the governing body, votes to continue the tax; at any time before
or after Oct. 1, 1979, the governing body of a city adopting a local sales and use tax may
exempt sales and use of gas and electricity for residential use from taxation or reimpose the
tax thereon); id. § 4(D) (in every city adopting a local sales and use tax there is imposed an
excise tax on the storage, use or other consumption within the city of gas and electricity for
residential use at the rate of one percent of the sales price, or in the case of leases and rentals,
one percent of the lease or rental price); id. § 5 (amended to provide for the administration,
collection, and enforcement by the comptroller of the local tax on gas and electricity for
residential use); id. § 6(C)(1) (amended to exclude from the Local Sales and Use Tax Act the
state sales and use tax exemption contained in TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(R) (Vernon
Supp. 1978-79) for gas and electricity sold for residential use); TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.01(AA) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (the definitions and other provisions of the Limited
Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act relating to collection, administration, enforcement, and sales
tax permits shall apply to sellers and purchasers whose sales and purchases are exempt from
the taxes imposed by the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act, but who are subject to the
taxes imposed by a city under the Local Sales and Use Tax Act).
112. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1282 (1978).
113. Summaries of comptroller's administrative decisions may be f6und in the following
looseleaf services: TEX. STATE TAX REP. (CCH); STATE & Loc. TAXES (P-H).
114. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8910 (1978) (where property was
purchased under a direct-pay permit within a local taxing jurisdiction and shipped by the
seller to the purchaser's facility that was not in a local taxing jurisdiction, local tax was not
due by virtue of the purchaser's taking possession of the goods outside a local taxing juris-
diction); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8733 (1978) (where tangible personal
property is purchased in a local taxing jurisdiction under a direct-pay permit and is stored or
kept at the purchaser's place of business within a local taxing jurisdiction before being used
at a job site outside the local taxing jurisdiction, local tax becomes due to the jurisdiction
where the property was stored or kept pursuant to TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c,
§ 6(B)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9790 (1978)
(where the taxpayer purchased tangible personal property from out-of-state vendors who
shipped the items directly to the taxpayer's plant, which was not in a local taxing jurisdic-
tion, the purchases were not subject to local use tax).
115. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8925 (1977) (a taxpayer who fabricated
and installed metal framework and ornamental ironwork on structures was improving realty
and thus was a contractor pursuant to TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(T) (Vernon 1969));
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9024 (1977) (a taxpayer who manufactured cus-
tom-made draperies and installed them into a customer's property was a contractor pursuant
to TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(T) (Vernon 1969)).
116. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8517 (1978) (the sale of 82% of the cor-
poration's assets to another corporation was a transfer of "substantially all the property held
or used" by the selling corporation within the definition of an occasional sale contained in
TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(F)(3) (Vernon 1969); if a selling corporation and a buying
corporation are wholly owned by a grandparent corporation, the "real or ultimate owner-
ship" of property soldbetween the two corporations is "substantially similar" both before
and after the sale for purposes of the definition of occasional sale contained in TEx. TAX.-
GEN. ANN. art. 20.01 (F)(3) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9121
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tions,' 1 7 and various other matters.' 18
(1978) (the sale of almost all the operating assets of a business to several persons with the
retention of several assets by the seller did not qualify as an occasional sale pursuant to TEX.
TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(F)(2) (Vernon 1969) because all the operating assets were not
sold to one purchaser); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8627 (1978) (sales of tax-
able items only are included in applying the occasional sale exemption contained in TEX.
TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(l) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No.
10187 (1978) (where a company made two wholesale sales of tangible personal property
within 12 months before or after making two retail sales of tangible personal property, it
made more than two sales of taxable items within the meaning of TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.01(F)(1) (Vernon 1969) and did not qualify for the occasional sale exemption on its two
retail sales); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9560 (1978) (the sale of an oil rig
and related accessories in a single transaction by a company that did not hold a sales tax
permit in Texas or in any other state during the 12-month period before and after the sale
and which during this period made only one other sale of tangible personal property was an
occasional sale pursuant to TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(F)(1) (Vernon 1969)); Comp-
troller's Administrative Decision No. 10356 (1978) (where a seller sold part of the operating
assets of its business to one purchaser and the remainder of the assets by a separate sale to
another purchaser, the seller did not make an occasional sale pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN.
ANN. art. 20.01(F) (Vernon 1969) and Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .036 because it did
not sell the entire operating assets of its business in one transaction to one purchaser).
117. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8823 (1978) (where a lump-sum con-
tractor for the improvement of realty makes a tax-free purchase of equipment that is used on
both exempt and nonexempt projects, the equipment is taxable based on the amount it de-
preciated during the period of time it was used in a nonexempt manner); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 7867 (1978) (tangible personal property that was purchased
outside of Texas for use at an out-of-state plant, used there for a period of one year, and
transferred for use in Texas only after the out-of-state plant was closed was not purchased
"for use in Texas" and thus was not subject to Texas use tax under TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN.
art. 20.03 (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8447 (1978) (beer,
which was originally purchased tax-free for resale but later used for promotional purposes
or as a political contribution, is taxable based on its original purchase price); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 8784 (1978) (the purchase of an aircraft by a Texas resident
who uses it to obtain an instrument ratingis not exempt under the flight training exemption
provided in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(Q) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79)); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 7253 (1978) (tangible personal property that was acquired tax-
free by the taxpayer from out-of-state vendors, brought into Texas, and thereafter shipped
outside of Texas as gifts to the taxpayer's customers was exempt from use tax pursuant to
TEX. TAx.-GEN.ANN. art. 20.04(G)(3)(b) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative De-
cision No. 9526 (1978) (sterile, protective clothing furnished by an employer and used to
prevent contamination of the product during various stages of manufacture and to protect
employees from harmful effects is exempt from sales and use tax pursuant to TEX. TAX.-
GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(l)(b) (Vernon 1969) as tangible personal property necessary or es-
sential to the manufacturing process).
118. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8906 (1977) (insurance proceeds re-
ceived as a result of the destruction of an aircraft are not subject to sales and use taxes since
such payments represent indemnity for a loss and not receipts from the sale of tangible
personal property); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9427 (1978) (when property
purchased in Texas under a direct payment permit certificate is only stored in Texas and
then used solely outside the state, the direct payment permit holder is not liable for Texas
use tax because storage incident to subsequent transportation out of state is excluded from
taxation under TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN, art. 20.01(0) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Adminis-
trative Decision No. 9683 (1978) (when a customer places an order for tangible personal
property and the seller must have the property shipped to it from the manufacturer, the
transportation charges paid by the seller to the manufacturer for this shipment are properly
includable in the seller's sales price because the charges are costs of transportation prior to
sale, which are includable as "receipts" pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.01(D)(l)(c) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9259 (1978) (the
production of film or videotape for an advertising agency constitutes processing and is taxa-
ble as a sale of tangible personal property); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8536
(1978) (when property purchased outside the state is shipped to the purchaser within Texas,
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IV. INHERITANCE TAXES
The legislature amended article 14.02(1)' 9 to provide that the basic in-
heritance tax rate for taxable property passing to or for the use of a Class A
beneficiary 2 ' shall be one percent of any value transferred not exceeding
$50,000. Previously, the one percent rate applied to the transfer of any
value in excess of $25,000 but not exceeding $50,000.121 Sections (2) and
(3) were added to article 14.02122 to provide that the amount of exemption
for Class A transfers is $200,000 for the period beginning September 1,
1978, through August 31, 1982; $250,000 for the period beginning Septem-
ber 1, 1982, through August 31, 1985; and $300,000 beginning on Septem-
ber 1, 1985.123 When more than one Class A beneficiary receives property
and the total amount of property passing to the Class A beneficiaries ex-
ceeds the amount of the exemption available under article 14.02(3), the
amount of the exemption is to be divided among the beneficiaries in a
manner proportional to the amount passing under article 14.02 to each
beneficiary.' 2 4 In no event shall a Class A beneficiary receive an exemp-
tion of less than $25,000. 25 The legislature also added article 14.015(5), 126
which provides that military pay or other military allowances paid to the
beneficiaries of a Texas resident who, while in active service of the armed
forces of the United States, is killed in action in a combat zone or is legally
declared dead after being classified as missing in action, is exempt from
inheritance tax.
V. AD VALOREM TAXES
A significant development during the survey period was the attorney
general's opinion that article 7150f'2 7 is unconstitutional. 28  The statute
use tax becomes due pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.031 (Vernon 1969) at the time
of the first storage, use, or other consumption rather than at the time of invoicing by the
vendor); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9866 (1978) (labor charges for
fabricating equipment are part of the sales price even though separately stated from the
material charge); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10041 (1978) (the comptroller
is not required to file a lien against the the seller of a business as a prerequisite to imposing
the sales tax liability of the seller against the purchaser as a successor to the business pursu-
ant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.09(f) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative De-
cision No. 9126 (1978) (where property was sold to the taxpayer under a sales contract for
$1.00 and the taxpayer in turn cleared or forgave the transferor of a debt unrelated to the
property sold, a taxable sale occurred for sales and use tax purposes with the sales price
being $1.00 plus the amount of the debt forgiven).
119. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.02(t) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
120. Class A beneficiaries include a husband or wife, any direct lineal descendant of a
husband or wife, any direct lineal descendant or ascendant of the decedent, the legally
adopted child or children, or any direct lineal descendant of the adopted child or children of
the decedent, or the husband of a daughter or the wife of a son. Id.
121. The $25,000 exemption is still available; it has merely been shifted to another sub-
section. See note 125 infra and accompanying text.
122. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.02(2)-(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
123. Id. art. 14.02(3).
124. Id. art. 14.02(2).
125. Id. art. 14.02(4).
126. Id. art. 14.015(5).
127. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150f (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
128. TEX. ATrr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1308 (1978).
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prevents taxation of certain property under two fact situations. The first
part of the statute pertains to property consigned from outside the state to
a consignee in Texas to be forwarded to a point outside the state. If the
property is entitled to be fowarded at through rates from the point of ori-
gin to the point of destination pursuant to Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion tariffs, rules and regulations, then the statute applies. The statute
provides that if such property is not detained within Texas for more than
ninety days, it is deemed to be property moving in interstate commerce
and thus not subject to state taxation. The second part of the statute per-
tains to goods, wares, ores, and merchandise that originate outside of
Texas and are detained in the state for not more than nine months for
purposes of assembly, storage, manufacturing, processing, or fabricating.
Such items are not subject to taxation because they are deemed to be lo-
cated in Texas for only a temporary period and thus do not acquire taxable
situs in the state.
The attorney general analyzed article 7150f in light of article VIII, sec-
tion 1 of the Texas Constitution,' 29 which, prior to its amendment in 1978,
provided for the taxation of "[a]ll property in this state,"' 30 and article
VIII, section 2 of the Texas Constitution, which provides for specific ex-
emptions from taxation and states that "all laws exempting property from
taxation other than the property mentioned in this Section shall be null
and void.""'3 Relying on prior cases that have interpreted these constitu-
tional provisions, 132 the attorney general reasoned that the constitutional
framers intended that all property be subject to taxation unless specifically
exempted by the Texas Constitution or by the legislature under constitu-
tional authorization. The attorney general noted, however, that the state is
prohibited by the commerce clause of the United States Constitution
133
from taxing any property in transit through the state.
With respect to the first segment of article 7150f, the attorney general
reasoned that property described therein should in fact be exempt from
state taxation only if the property is actually moving in interstate com-
merce and is thus immune from taxation pursuant to the United States
Constitution. This determination, according to the attorney general, is a
fact question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. While the attorney
general recognized that some of the property described in the first part of
article 7150f was unquestionably moving in interstate commerce, he ar-
gued against the presumption that all of the property described therein was
129. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
130. The recently enacted amendment will not alter the attorney general's opinion be-
cause the section still provides that all real property and tangible personal property shall be
taxed.
131. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
132. Leander Independent School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d
908 (Tex. 1972); City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, 170 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1943, writ refd).
133. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. TEx. CONST. art. 1, § I provides that Texas is subject to
the United States Constitution.
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exempt from taxation pursuant to the United States Constitution. The at-
torney general concluded that to the extent the first part of article 7150f
forbade taxation of property that Texas courts would hold had come to
rest in the state, the provision would be held to be an unconstitutional
attempt to exempt taxable property.
The attorney general's analysis of the second part of article 7150f
framed the basic legal issue as involving constitutional limits on legislative
authority to define taxable situs. Article VIII, section 11 of the Texas Con-
stitution provides that all property shall be assessed for taxation in the
county "where situated."' 34 Relying on a prior Texas Supreme Court de-
cision, which stated that the constitutional provision permits "reasonable
legislative action" to fix tax situs, 135 the attorney general concluded that
Texas courts would require the tax situs statutes to have a reasonable basis
in fact and common law principles. Since article 7150f prohibits taxation
of goods that are owned by Texas taxpayers, are physicially present in the
state for a sufficient time to acquire tax situs in common law, and are not
exempt as being in interstate commerce, the attorney general further con-
cluded that neither the facts nor common law principles supported the
conclusion that taxable situs lay outside of Texas. The attorney general
therefore opined that the Texas courts would find article 7150f invalid in
that it goes beyond reasonable legislative action to define tax situs and
instead uses tax situs as a vehicle for granting a property tax exemption. 1
36
During the survey period several developments concerning the assess-
ment of argicultural lands for ad valorem tax purposes were significant.
The Texas attorney general concluded that article VIII, section 1-d of the
Texas Constitution,' which, in general, establishes a standard of assess-
ment other than fair market value for land designated for agricultural use,
probably does not apply to land owned by a Texas partnership. 38 Relying
primarily on the decision in Nacogdoches Independent School District P.
McKinney,13 9 the attorney general reasoned that land owned by a partner-
ship formed pursuant to the Texas Uniform Partnership Act'4 is to be
treated for ad valorem tax purposes as property owned by a separate legal
entity and not as property owned by the partners as individuals. Conse-
quently, lan owned by a partnership does not constitute "land owned by
natural per ons " as required by article VIII, section 1-d.
In another opinion relating to the agricultural assessment provisions of
134. Tg. CONST. art. VIII, § I1.
135. Great S. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778 (Tex. 1922).
136. The attorney general also relied on the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
Foulger Equip. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 165, 397 P.2d 298 (1964), in which the
court held that a similar statute violated a Utah constitutional provision requiring that all
tangible personal property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States or the
state constitution, be taxed in proportion to its value. The attorney general concluded that
the Texas courts would hold that article 7150f violates the corresponding provisions of the
Texas Constitution.
137. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d.
138. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1287 (1978).
139. 504 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.), modfifed, 513 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. 1974).
140. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1978-79).
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the Texas Constitution, the attorney general concluded that a local tax as-
sessor-collector could impose a requirement that applicants for the agricul-
tural use designation furnish him with copies of relevant portions of their
federal income tax returns.14' The attorney general noted, however, that a
federal income tax return submitted to a tax assessor-collector by an appli-
cant for the agricultural use designation is confidential and is thus ex-
cepted from disclosure under the Open Records Act.' 42
In Jay v. Devers 43 the taxpayer filed suit against the tax assessor-collec-
tor to recover payment of 1974 ad valorem taxes paid under protest. The
taxpayer contended that those taxes had been overpaid as a result of the
tax assessor-collector's failure to assess her property pursuant to the agri-
cultural use provisions of article VIII, section l-d. The court denied recov-
ery on two grounds. First, the court held that under Texas law there is no
claim for recovery of taxes paid voluntarily, and a mere showing that ad
valorem taxes were paid "under protest" will not mandate a finding of
involuntary payment in support of the taxpayer's claim for recovery.'"
Second, the court held that the taxpayer's unsworn application to have the
property assessed for agricultural use, which was filed on December 31,
1974, was not timely.
Failure to file a timely application for agricultural use treatment was
also fatal to the taxpayer's case in Moore v. White.'4 ' In that case the
taxpayer's application to have the property assessed for agricultural use for
the year 1973 was filed on December 18, 1973. The court held that the
taxpayer's application was not timely filed since the taxpayer waited until
after the taxing authorities' plans of taxation were put into effect before
filing the application for exemption.
The court in Maxwell v. White146 also denied agricultural use treatment
to a taxpayer. Upon denial of his application for agricultural use treat-
ment, the taxpayer in Maxwell filed suit seeking to permanently enjoin the
taxing authority from assessing his land on any basis other than an agricul-
tural assessment. While the taxpayer's suit was pending on the court's
docket without being actively prosecuted by the taxpayer, the taxing au-
thority proceeded with the usual and customary activities of carrying its
plan of taxation into effect. After the plan of taxation was put into effect,
the taxpayer brought his suit to trial and obtained the requested injunctive
relief from the trial court. Reversing the judgment of the trial court, the
court of civil appeals held that when the taxpayer brought his suit to trial,
his action for injunctive relief was moot since the taxing authority already
had put its plan of taxation into effect. The court further held that since
141. TEX. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. H-1274 (1978).
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
143. 563 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
144. The court cited National Biscuit Co. v. State, 134 Tex. 293, 135 S.W.2d 687 (1940);
Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 272, 71 S.W.2d 242 (1934); and Howell v. City of
Dallas, 549 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
145. 569 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. 564 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
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the taxpayer's gross income from commercial rentals on the property was
five to six hundred percent greater than his gross income from his agricul-
tural activities, as a matter of law he was disqualified from having his land
assessed as agricultural use property.
The exemption from taxation of a rest home as a purely public charity
pursuant to section 7 of article 7150' was upheld in Needville Independent
School District v. S.J S T Rest Home."4 8 The school district attacked
the rest home's right to the exemption on several grounds. First, the school
district contended that the rest home failed to prove that it made no gain
or profit from its operations. Relying on City of McAllen v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Society,149 the court held that the realization of
a profit would not subject the organization to taxation if the profits were
used to maintain or expand the organization's operations. In Needville the
record established that all of the rest home's profits were used for capital
improvements or mortgage payments. Second, the school district con-
tended that the rest home failed to prove that it qualified as a purely public
charity. To qualify for this status, a charitable organization must show
that it assumes, to a material extent, costs that otherwise might become an
obligation of the community or the state. The court held that the rest
home met this condition for exempt status by accepting applicants without
regard to their financial conditions. While payments were made by the
State Welfare Department on behalf of some indigents, the rest home had
a special charitable fund from which it subsidized the payments of those
who could not afford to pay the complete costs.
The court in Needville distinguished the recently decided case of Air
Force Village Foundation, Inc. v. Northside Independent School District.5 '
In that case a tax exemption was denied an organization formed for the
purpose of providing elderly persons with services and housing facilities
specially designed for their needs. In upholding the jury findings that the
Air Force Village Foundation was not a purely public charity, the court
noted that while the charter of the organization mandated that at least one-
third of the residents be persons that needed charity, the organization had
been unable to attract persons in this category. Most of the residents of Air
Force Village were high-ranking officers and their spouses or widows, and
the percentage of residents actually receiving charity was extremely small
when compared with the percentage of residents paying the full charges
assessed by the organization. The court concluded that these facts could
have led the jury to the reasonable conclusion that Air Force Village
Foundation was an institution structured as a comfortable retirement
home for retired officers and their spouses or widows and was not an insti-
tution structured in either form or operations to meet the special residen-
tial requirements of elderly persons suffering from distressed
147. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
148. 566 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
149. 530 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1975).
150. 561 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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circumstances. The jury had grounds to believe that the institution,
through its organization and actual operations, did not assume to a mate-
rial extent any obligation or duty of the community or the state. Accord-
ingly, the court of civil appeals held that the Air Force Village Foundation
failed to establish that it was a purely public charity pursuant to section 7
of article 7150.
In Satterlee v. Guf Coast Waste DisposalAuthority'- the supreme court
ruled that integrated regional waste facilities owned by the Gulf Coast
Waste Disposal Authority were not exempt from ad valorem taxation.
The disposal authority, a conservation and reclamation district formed
pursuant to article XVI, section 59 of the Texas Constitution,' 5 2 claimed
that the facilities and the land on which they were situated were exempt
from ad valorem taxation pursuant to article VIII, section 2(a) of the Texas
Constitution, 53 which authorizes the legislature to exempt public property
used for public purposes, and section 4 of article 7150,154 which exempts
from taxation all property belonging exclusively to the state or any politi-
cal subdivision thereof. The supreme court ruled that the facilities were
not exempt from ad valorem taxation because the written instruments un-
derlying the arrangement between the disposal authority and the partici-
pating industries, when viewed in their entirety, did not vest exclusive
ownership of the property in the disposal authority as required for tax ex-
emption. The court reasoned that the disposal authority's title to the facili-
ties was encumbered by the underlying instruments for the use and benefit
of various private industries and that the disposal authority held title only
so long as the property was used as a facility for the treatment of industrial
waste. The court therefore concluded that the disposal authority had sub-
stantially less than exclusive ownership of the property in question.
Relying on the supreme court's prior decision in City of Beaumont v.
Fertitta,'"I the disposal authority argued that even assuming that the un-
derlying instruments gave the private industries an equitable interest in the
facilities, this fact did not prevent the property from being exempt from
taxation under section 4 of article 7150. Rejecting this argument, the court
stated that in Fertitta the legal title of the city of Beaumont was not en-
cumbered as was that of the disposal authority under the facilities agree-
ment, and no question was raised or decided in Fertitta with respect to the
exclusive ownership prerequisite to tax exemption. Since the court con-
cluded that the disposal authority was not vested with the requisite exclu-
sive ownership, it considered unnecessary a re-examination of the holding
in Fertitta that section 4 of article 7150 exempts municipal property from
taxation regardless of the use to which it is put or the purposes for which it
is held. In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Greenhill agreed with the
court's judgment that the property in question was encumbered by the fa-
151. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 66 (Nov. 1, 1978).
152. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
153. Id. art. VIII, § 2(a).
154. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 4 (Vernon 1960).
155. 415 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1967).
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cilities agreement for the use and benefit of the private industries, but was
unable to reconcile the court's decision with the holding in Fertitta. Not-
ing that he had joined in the dissent in the Fertita case, Chief Justice
Greenhill stated that Fertitta was wrongly decided.
In its motion for rehearing the disposal authority argued that the prop-
erty in question was exempt from taxation pursuant to article XI, section 9
of the Texas Constitution,' 56 which exempts property of counties, cities
and towns that is owned and held for only public purposes. Rejecting this
contention, the court held that, for the reasons stated in its original opin-
ion, the property did not satisfy the requirements of article XI, section 9
since the property was not held solely for public purposes and was not
devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public.'57
In Brunken Toyota, Inc. v. City of Lubbock 5 the court refused to invali-
date a cycle reassessment program established by the city of Lubbock and
the Lubbock Independent School District. Pursuant to this plan, the city
was divided into five zones with the intent that one zone would be reap-
praised each year for tax purposes. The taxpayers contended that the cycle
reassessment policy of the taxing authorities and their formula, method,
and system of assessment adopted for the years 1975 and 1976 were inva-
lid, arbitrary, and capricious. In rejecting the taxpayers' claims and up-
holding the cycle reassessment program, the court relied on an early
holding of the United States Supreme Court that a taxpayer complaining
of a reapprasial program must establish that the taxing authority intention-
ally violated the principle of uniformity. 59 The court also relied exten-
sively on the holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in Hamilton v.
Adkins, 16° in which a board of equalization had developed a four-year
systematic plan of review and revision of assessments similar to the plan
adopted by the city of Lubbock. The complainants in Hamilton alleged
that the resulting inequality in their property valuations violated the Ala-
bama Constitution's uniformity requirements, which were similar to those
found in the Texas Constitution. In upholding the four-year revaluation
plan, the Alabama Supreme Court held that there must be a systematic
and intentional discrimination before the Alabama Constitution was vio-
lated. The court found no fraud or evil intent on the part of the board of
equalization and pointed out that mere inequality in valuation did not
contravene Alabama's constitutional provisions.
In upholding the city of Lubbock's cycle reassessment program, the
Texas court relied on the strong presumption that a board of equalization
acts in good faith in exercising its quasi-judicial function. The court fur-
156. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
157. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 176 (Dec. 29, 1978).
158. 558 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
160. 250 Ala. 557, 35 So. 2d 183 (1948). The court noted that cyclical revaluation pro-
grams also had been approved in Skinner v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 66 N.M. 221,




ther held that a comparison of the assessed values of comparable property
in other zones of the city with the assessed value applied to the taxpayers'
properties failed to establish that the taxpayers had suffered substantial
injury.
The constitutionality of two valuation statutes enacted by the legislature
in 1977 was considered in an opinion of the Texas attorney general issued
during the survey period.'61 The first statute, article 7150/,162 relates to the
assessment of common areas in residential subdivisions or condominium
complexes. Typically, such common areas are nominally owned by a non-
profit corporation which assesses membership fees and maintains the facil-
ities for the use and benefit of the residents of the subdivision or
condominium complex. Article 71501 requires that all property held by
such nonprofit corporations be assessed for tax purposes on the basis of a
nominal value. The statute is based upon the recognition that the valua-
tion of the common areas is actually reflected in the enhanced valuation of
the property owned by the individual members and the assessment of such
nominally owned property on the basis of its fair market value would re-
sult in double taxation. The attorney general concluded that article 71501
violates article VIII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution'63 because it ap-
plies a standard other than market value. The attorney general recog-
nized, however, that the property nominally owned by such nonprofit
corporations is in effect burdened with an easement in favor of the corpo-
ration's members, and that such easement will diminish the value of the
servient estate and increase the value of the dominant estate. While the
attorney general noted that a tax assessment must recognize the decreased
value of the servient estate, he concluded that it was improper for the legis-
lature to mandate that in all instances the value of the servient estate was
nominal.
The second statute considered in the opinion, article 7150n,'" prescribes
a procedure whereby the owner of fee simple title to a five-or-more-acre
tract of real estate may limit the use of the land to recreational, park, or
open space use for a term of ten or more years by filing an appropriate
restriction instrument with the county clerk. Such restriction instrument
can be enforced in the same manner as deed restrictions by the county
attorney or by any person owning or having any interest in the restricted
property. The statute provides that when assessing such restricted prop-
erty, the tax assessor shall consider no factors other than those relative to
the value of the land as restricted. In concluding that article 7150n was
valid, the attorney general reasoned that the statute adopted the constitu-
tional standard of market value and recognized that market value must be
ascertained in light of the relevant deed restrictions or restriction instru-
ments.
161. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1220 (1978).
162. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 71501 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
163. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
164. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150n (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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In El Campo Independent School District v. Kimmey 165 the supreme
court held that article 7297,166 which provides that the state and county are
exempt from liability for any costs growing out of a collection suit, is avail-
able to school districts by virtue of article 7343,167 which provides that all
laws enacted for the purposes of collecting delinquent state and county
taxes are also available to cities, towns, and independent school districts.
Thus, the court ruled that costs could not be assessed against either the
school district that filed the delinquent tax suit or against the state, county,
or city that intervened in the school district's suit. Other decisions and
attorney general opinions that were issued during the survey period and
relate to ad valorem taxes are set forth in the notes.1
68
A significant development during the survey period was the enactment
and approval by the electorate of amendments to article VIII of the Texas
Constitution. Article VIII, section 1 was amended to repeal the poll tax, to
165. 571 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1978).
166. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7297 (Vernon 1960).
167. Id. art. 7343.
168. Gray-Taylor, Inc. v. Harris County, 569 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
351, 58 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1978) (the federal district court properly dismissed a class action suit
brought by taxpayers seeking to enjoin the county's implementation of its tax system when
there was pend mg in state court a suit by a different plaintiff against the same defendants
seeking the same class action injunctive relief); Lifetime Communities, Inc. v. Carrollton-
Farmers Branch Independent School Dist., 568 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978,
no writ) (award of attorneys' fees to a school district in the amount of 10% of the delinquent
taxes, penalties and interests awarded to the school district was proper); Watkins v. New
Diana Independent School Dist., 568 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ) (taxpayers' suit to enjoin approval of tax roll and collection of tax on grounds that tax
roll was prepared under and based on a fundamentally erroneous and arbitrary plan of
valuation was not subject to involuntary dismissal; if taxpayers had not stated a cause of
action, they should have been afforded an opportunity to amend their pleadings); Campbell
v. County of Bexar, 567 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(when a taxpayer attacks the assessment of taxes against him on the ground that the plan or
system used by the taxing authority was arbitrary or illegal, the taxpayer must sustain the
burden of proving not only that the plan was arbitrary and illegal, but also that the use of
the plan operated to his substantial injury); Del Valle Independent School Dist. Bd. of
Equalization v. Hackett, 563 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.) (tax-
payers established that school district utilized fundamentally wrong and erroneous scheme
of taxation in that tax assessor utilized unequal valuations of comparable properties in dif-
ferent sections of the district); Keystone Operating Co. v. Runge Independent School Dist.,
558 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (in delinquent tax suit
taxpayer has burden of showing gross discrimination against him by virtue of comparison of
assessments against his property with assessments against other like property; otherwise tax-
payer can defeat recovery of taxes only to the extent they were excessive, and taxpayer must
assume burden of proving excessiveness and must show the extent to which the plan of
taxation worked to his substantial injury); TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-I 187 (1978) (Hous-
ton Independent School District resolution granting an additional $10,000 homestead tax
exemption to citizens 65 years of age or older whose annual income is below a particular
amount violates TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b, which empowers political subdivisions to
rant a homestead tax exemption based solely on the taxpayer's age and residence on the
omestead property); TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1108 (1977) (properties purportedly
leased by cities to private manufacturers were not exempt from taxation because the cities
never legally acquired an ownership interest in such properties; although property that the
tax assessor-collector lists on the tax rolls as non-exempt cannot be reclassified as property
exempt from taxation by the county commissioners court sitting as a board of equalization,
assessments made by a tax assessor-collector on such properties later can be reviewed by the
commissioners court, sitting as the court, which may order the assessments reassessed).
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provide that all real and tangible personal property be taxed according to
its value, and to authorize the legislature to provide for taxation of intangi-
ble personal property. 169 Prior to its amendment, section 1 required that
all property, including intangible personal property, be taxed according to
its value. The amendments to article VIII, section 1 also provide that the
legislature shall exempt household goods and personal effects not held or
used for the production of income. Prior to the amendment, $250 worth of
household and kitchen furniture was exempt from tax. The amendments
also authorized the legislature to exempt from taxation all or part of the
personal property homestead of a family or single adult. The term "per-
sonal property homestead" is defined to mean personal property exempt
by law from forced sale for debt.
The amendments added article VIII, section 1-d-1,7' which requires the
legislature to provide by general law for taxation of open space land de-
voted to farm or ranch purposes on the basis of its productive capacity.
The legislature also was given authority to provide by general law for taxa-
tion of open space land devoted to timber production on the basis of its
productive capacity. In addition, the legislature was empowered to pro-
vide eligibility limitations and to impose sanctions in furtherance of the
taxation policy of this provision. If a property owner qualifies his land for
designation as agricultural use property, pursuant to article VIII, section I-
d,1 ' the land is subject to the provisions of section 1-d for the year in
which the designation is effective and is not subject to any laws enacted
under section 1-d-1 during that year.
The basis of the residential homestead exemption for the elderly was
changed through amendments to article VIII, section 1-b.'7 2 The amend-
ments to section 1-b(b) change the basis of the residence homestead ex-
emption for the elderly that can be enacted by political subdivisions from
assessed value to market value of the residence homestead. The $3,000
homestead exemption has been extended to persons who are determined to
be under a disability for purposes of payment of disability insurance bene-
fits under Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance or its suc-
cessor. An eligible disabled person who is also sixty-five years or older
may not receive both exemptions from the same political subdivision in the
same year, but may choose either exemption if the subdivision has adopted
both.
The amendments also added article VIII, section 1-b(c), 7 3 which ex-
empts $5,000 of the market value of a residence homestead of a married or
unmarried adult from property taxation for general elementary and secon-
dary public school purposes. In addition to this exemption, the legislature
has been authorized to exempt an additional $10,000 of a residence home-
stead of a disabled person and of a person sixty-five years of age or older.
169. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
170. Id. § 1-d-1.
171. Id. § I-d.
172. Id. § I-b(b).
173. Id. § I-b(c).
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The additional exemption may be based on economic need. An eligible
disabled person who is sixty-five years or older may not receive both ex-
emptions from a school district, but may choose either. If an ad valorem
tax previously has been pledged for the payment of school district debt and
cessation of the levy would impair the obligation of the contract by which
the debt was created, the taxing officers of a school district may continue to
levy and collect the tax against the value of homesteads exempted under
article VIII, section 1-b(c) until the debt is discharged. If a person receives
the additional homestead exemption based on age, property taxes cannot
be increased on such person's residence homestead unless the value of the
homestead is increased by improvements other than those made to comply
with governmental requirements.'74 The legislature is required to provide
formulas to protect school districts against all or part of the revenue loss
incurred by the implementation of article VIII, sections 1-b(c), 1-b(d) and
1-d- 1. 17 5
Article VIII, section 21176 was added to provide that the total amount of
property taxes imposed by a political subdivision in any year may not ex-
ceed the total amount of property taxes imposed by that subdivision in the
preceding year, unless the governing body of the subdivision gives notice
of its intent to consider an increase in taxes and holds a public hearing on
the proposed increase before acting. In calculating the total amount of
taxes imposed in the current year, the taxes on property in territory added
to the political subdivision since the preceding year and on new improve-
ments that were not taxable in the preceding year are excluded. In calcu-
lating the total amount of taxes imposed in the preceding year, the taxes
imposed on real property that is not taxable by the subdivision in the cur-
rent year are excluded. The legislature is required to provide by general
law that a property owner be given notice of a revaluation and of the
amount of taxes that will result from the reappraised value if neither the
tax rate nor the assessment ratio in effect during the preceding year is re-
duced.
Article VIII, section 22177 was added to provide that in no biennium
shall the rate of growth of appropriations from state tax revenues not dedi-
cated to specified purposes by the constitution exceed the estimated rate of
growth of the state's economy. The legislature may provide for appropria-
tions in excess of this amount if it adopts a resolution approved by a record
vote of the majority of the membership of each house that an emergency
exists and such emergency is identified. In no case, however, can appropri-
ations exceed revenues.
Statewide appraisal of real property for ad valorem tax purposes is pro-
hibited by article VIII, section 23.17s Nevertheless, formula distribution of
tax revenues to political subdivisions of the state is not precluded by this
174. Id. § l-b(d).
175. d. § l-b(c).
176. Id. § 21.
177. Id. § 22.
178. Id. § 23.
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amendment. Section 23 also provides that administrative and judicial en-
forcement of uniform standards and procedures for appraisal of property
for ad valorem tax purposes shall originate in the county in which the
taxes are imposed, except that the legislature may provide by general law
for political subdivisions with boundaries extending outside the county.
Legislation was enacted to restrict increases in property taxes by local
taxing units.'7 9 The statute provides that a taxing unit may not impose
property taxes in any year until its governing body has adopted a tax rate
for that year. The taxing unit's governing body may not adopt a tax rate
that exceeds the rate calculated and announced for the preceding tax year
by more than three percent until it has given public notice of its intention
to adopt a higher rate and has held a public hearing on the proposed in-
crease.' 8 ° A specific method is provided for computation of the effective
tax rate,' 8 ' and procedures are set forth for providing notice of the tax
increase, for holding a public hearing, and for holding a meeting for voting
on the proposed increase.' 8 2 The statute also requires the tax assessor-
collector to mail a written notice to each property owner whose property
value has been increased by more than $100 above its value in the preced-
ing year.183
VI. MISCELLANEOUS STATE TAX MATTERS
During the survey period the United States Supreme Court handed
down several significant decisions in the state tax area. In Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos. 184 the Court held
that the State of Washington could apply its business and occupation tax
to stevedoring without violating the Constitution. The taxpayers chal-
lenged the validity of the tax on the grounds that it violated both the com-
merce clause' 85 and the import-export clause' 86 of the United States
Constitution. Relying on Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,'87 the
Court held that to be consistent with the commerce clause a tax must meet
the following four requirements: it must be applied to an activity that has a
substantial nexus with the state, it must be fairly apportioned, it cannot
discriminate against interstate commerce, and it must be fairly related to
the services provided by the state. The Court concluded that the Washing-
ton tax satisfied these standards in that the stevedoring operations were
conducted entirely within the state, the tax was levied solely on the value
of the loading and unloading that occurred in Washington, the tax rate did
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and there was nothing in the
179. 1978 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv., 2d Called Sess., ch. 8, §§ 1-8, at 18 (Vernon).
180. Id. § 2, at 19.
181. Id. § 1, at 18.
182. Id. §§ 3-4, at 18-19.
183. Id. §5, at 20.
184. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
186. Id. § 10, cl. 2.
187. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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record to suggest that the tax was not fairly related to the services and
protection provided by the state.
In considering whether the Washington tax violated the import-export
clause, the Court applied the tests developed in Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages.'88 Prior to Michelin, state taxes on imported goods that were still
in the "original package" and on exported goods that had entered the "ex-
port stream" were banned by the import-export clause. In Michelin the
Court replaced these tests with an analysis that examined whether the tax
offended any of the three policy considerations that led to the inclusion of
the import-export clause: (1) did the tax usurp the federal government's
authority to regulate foreign commerce and policy uniformly; (2) did the
tax deprive the federal government of import revenues by diverting them
to the state or by significantly raising the cost of imported goods and
thereby lowering consumer demand; and (3) did the tax cause friction and
disharmony among the states by enabling favorably situated coastal states
to exact a tax on goods destined for inland states.
Applying this analysis, the Court determined that the application of the
Washington business and occupation tax to stevedoring did not threaten
the policies underlying the import-export clause. First, the tax did not re-
strain the ability of the federal government to conduct foreign policy, and
as a general business tax that applied to virtually all businesses in the state,
the tax did not create any special protective tariff. Second, the effect of the
Washington tax on federal import revenues was determined to be identical
to the effect in Michelin. The tax merely compensated the state for services
and protection, such as police and fire, extended by Washington to the
stevedoring business. The Court stated that any indirect effect on the de-
mand for imported goods caused by the tax on the value of loading and
unloading them from their ship was even less substantial than the effect of
a direct ad valorem property tax on the imported goods themselves. Third,
the Court held that since the prevention of interstate friction did not differ
significantly from the primary purpose of the commerce clause, a tax meet-
ing the four commerce clause conditions set forth in Complete Auto Transit
necessarily satisfied the third test set forth in Michelin.
Several possible bases for distinguishing the Michelin decision were re-
jected by the Court. The Court noted that the activity taxed by the State of
Washington occurred while imports and exports were in transit, while in
Michelin the goods that were taxed already had reached their destination.
Nevertheless, the Court held that since the Washington tax fell upon a
service as opposed to the goods themselves, the Michelin policy analysis
should not be discarded merely because the goods were in transit. Further,
although the state tax in question in Michelin touched only imports, the
Court held that the Michelin analysis would apply to taxation involving
exports as well.
The taxpayers made two additional arguments, both of which were re-
jected by the Court. First, the taxpayers argued that the import-export
188. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
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clause effected an absolute prohibition on all taxation of imports and ex-
ports. Rejecting this contention, the Court held that the import-export
clause prohibited only "imposts or duties" and did not necessarily encom-
pass all taxes. Second, the taxpayers argued that the Washington tax im-
posed a transit fee upon inland consumers which violated the import-
export clause. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that, as is the case
in commerce clause jurisprudence, interstate friction will not chafe when
commerce pays for the state services it enjoys. The Court concluded that
fair taxation could be assured by the prohibition of discrimination and by
the requirements of apportionment, nexus, and reasonable relationship be-
tween tax and benefits. The Court reasoned that a requirement that
coastal states subsidize the commerce of inland consumers could well exac-
erbate, rather than diminish, friction among the states.
The validity of the Multistate Tax Compact, of which Texas is a mem-
ber, 1 1 was sustained in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Com-
mission. 9 ° The Multistate Tax Compact was entered into by a number of
states for the stated purposes of (1) facilitating proper determinations of
state and local tax liabilities of multistate taxpayers; (2) promoting uni-
formity and compatibility in state tax systems; (3) facilitating taxpayer
convenience and compliance in the filing of tax returns and in other phases
of tax administration; and (4) avoiding duplicative taxation. To these ends
the compact created the Multistate Tax Commission, which is composed of
the tax administrators from all the member states. The commission is au-
thorized to study state and local tax systems, to develop and recommend
proposals to increase uniformity in state and local tax laws, and to compile
and publish information that may assist member states in implementing
the compact and multistate taxpayers in complying with the tax laws.
The commission is authorized to adopt uniform administrative regula-
tions that are advisory only, and each member state has the power to re-
ject, disregard, amend, or modify any rules or regulations promulgated by
the commission. Such rules and regulations have no force in any member
state until adopted by the state in accordance with its own law. Any mem-
ber state, or a political subdivision thereof, is authorized to request that the
commission perform an audit on its behalf, and the commission, as the
state's auditing agent, may seek compulsory process in aid of its auditing
power in the courts of any state specifically permitting such procedure.
Individual member states retain complete control over all legislation and
administrative action affecting the rate of tax, the composition of the tax
base, and the means and methods of determining tax liability and of col-
lecting any taxes determined to be due. Each member state is free to with-
draw from the compact at any time.
United States Steel challenged the constitutionality of the compact on
the grounds that (1) it was invalid under the compact clause of the Consti-
189. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7359a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
190. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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tution, 9 ' which prohibits any state from entering into any agreement or
compact with another state without the consent of Congress; (2) it unrea-
sonably burdened interstate commerce; and (3) it violated the rights of
multistate taxpayers under the fourteenth amendment.' 92 The Court held
that the Multistate Tax Compact was valid under the compact clause even
though it had never received congressional approval. The Court relied on
the interpretation of the compact clause set forth in Virginia v. Tennes-
see 19 3 to the effect that the consent of Congress is necessary only for those
agreements between states which may tend to increase and build up the
political influence of a contracting state so as to encroach upon or impair
the supremacy of the federal government or interfere with the federal gov-
ernment's rightful management of particular subjects placed under its con-
trol. The Court concluded that the Multistate Tax Compact does not
enhance state power at the expense of federal supremacy because the com-
pact does not purport to authorize the member states to exercise any power
they could not exercise in its absence. Further, there was no delegation of
sovereign power to the Multistate Tax Commission; each state retained
complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the com-
mission and was free to withdraw at any time.
The Court also rejected contentions that certain practices of the commis-
sion, including its use in audits of "unitary business" and "combination of
income" methods for determining a corporate taxpayer's income, en-
croached upon federal supremacy with respect to interstate commerce.
The Court reasoned that whether or not these risks were real, they could
not be attributed to the existence of the commission because the regula-
tions and practices proposed by the commission were merely advisory until
made law by each member state, and any state could choose to adopt such
practices even if the compact did not exist. Thus, any possible interference
with interstate commerce was not due to the compact.
Similarly, the Court concluded that the commission's enforcement pow-
ers did not encroach upon federal supremacy. The Court reasoned that
such enforcement powers amounted to nothing more than reciprocal legis-
lation for providing mutual assistance to the auditors of the member states
and did not enhance state power to the detriment of federal supremacy.
In addition, the Court rejected arguments that the compact encroached
upon the federal government's powers with respect to foreign relations. It
was contended that the commission had conducted multinational audits in
which it had applied the unitary business method to foreign corporate tax-
payers, a procedure that would be in conflict with tax conventions between
the United States government and various foreign governments. In re-
jecting this argument, the Court reasoned that in performing its audits the
commission adopted the particular methods specified by the states request-
ing the audits. Thus, the existence of the compact had no bearing on an
191, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
192. Id. amend. XIV.
193. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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individual state's ability to utilize the unitary business method in deter-
mining the income of a multinational taxpayer. Challenges to the compact
under the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment on the grounds
that the commission induced states to issue burdensome requests for the
production of documents and to violate their own laws by issuing arbitrary
assessments were summarily rejected. The Court held that these allega-
tions did not establish a violation of either the commerce clause or the
fourteenth amendment. Further, the Court noted that only the individual
states, and not the commission, had the power to issue assessments, and
state remedies were available for violations of state law.
In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair194 the Court upheld the validity
of Iowa's single-factor sales formula for apportioning the income of inter-
state businesses for state income tax purposes. Under the Iowa income tax
statute, if a corporation's business was not conducted entirely within Iowa,
a tax was imposed only on the portion of its income "reasonably attributa-
ble to its business within the state." The statute set forth two steps to com-
pute the share of the corporation's income "reasonably attributable" to
Iowa. First, certain income, "the geographical source of which is easily
identifiable," is attributed entirely to the state within which it is earned.
Second, if the remaining income is derived from the manufacture or sale of
tangible personal property, the part thereof attributable to business within
the state is. the proportion which the gross sales made within the state bear
to the total gross sales. If the taxpayer believes that application of this
single-factor formula subjects it to taxation on a greater portion of its net
income than is "reasonably attributable" to business within Iowa, it may
file a statement of objection and submit an alternative method of appor-
tionment.
The taxpayer, an Illinois corporation selling animal feed manufactured
in Illinois to Iowa customers through Iowa salesmen and warehouses,
brought an action alleging that the Iowa single-factor formula violated the
commerce clause' 95 and the due process clauses of the fifth'9 6 and four-
teenth1 97 amendments. The Court rejected the taxpayer's arguments and
sustained the validity of the statutes.
The taxpayer based its due process clause claim on the premise that any
state taxing formula that reaches income not in fact earned within the tax-
ing state violates due process. The taxpayer claimed that Iowa's appor-
tionment formula resulted in the taxation of income generated outside of
Iowa by the taxpayer's Illinois manufacturing operations. The Court re-
jected this argument on the ground that the record did not contain any
accounting analysis showing what portion of the corporation's net income
was attributable to its Illinois operations; the taxpayer had not attempted
to apportion its profits among its sales activities, manufacturing opera-
194. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
196. Id. amend. V.
197. Id. amend. XIV.
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tions, and other phases of its business. Further, even if the record con-
tained such proof, the Court held that the due process clause does not
prohibit state taxing formulas that may result in taxation of some income
that did not have its source in the taxing state. In this connection the
Court reasoned that the due process clause places two restrictions on a
state's power to tax income generated by the activities of interstate busi-
ness. First, no tax may be imposed unless there is some minimal connec-
tion between those activities and the taxing state. Second, the income
attributed to the state for tax purposes must be rationally related to "values
connected with the taxing state." The Court held that the first requirement
plainly was satisfied and that the statute could be held invalid under the
second requirement only if the taxpayer produced clear and cogent evi-
dence that the income attributed to Iowa was in fact out of all appropriate
proportion to the business transacted in Iowa or led to a grossly distorted
result. Since the taxpayer failed to show that the single-factor formula
produced an arbitrary result, the taxpayer's due process claim was rejected.
The taxpayer's commerce clause claim was based on the contention that
both Illinois and Iowa taxed part of the income derived from the tax-
payer's Iowa sales and that this duplicative taxation was caused by Iowa's
single-factor apportionment formula. The Court dismissed the taxpayer's
duplicative taxation argument as speculative, again emphasizing that the
taxpayer failed to present accounting evidence as to the portions of its net
income derived from each state. Further, the Court reasoned that even
assuming some -overlap existed, the Iowa single-factor apportionment
formula was not necessarily at fault because the duplication would be the
result of the use of different taxing formulas by the various states in which
the taxpayer conducted business.
In addition, the Court held that the commerce clause does not prohibit
all overlapping taxation of interstate businesses. In this connection, the
Court reasoned that if the commerce clause were read to mandate a prohi-
bition against any overlapping taxation of interstate businesses, such a
holding would require the enactment of national uniform rules for the ap-
portionment of interstate corporations' net incomes. The Court stated that
the power to enact such uniform rules was granted to the Congress and not
to the judiciary.
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